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INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment1 both grants power
to the government and constrains its use.2 In granting the power to
take private property,3 even over the protest of the property holder,
the clause signals that individual property rights are in some sense
subordinate to the good of the polity. The government has the au-
thority to determine that a public good is better served by dispossess-
ing a property holder of her land and putting it to a different use.
But the government's power to take private property is limited in two
respects by the Takings Clause. Not only must the taking be appro-
priately compensated, but it must be justified, in some respect, by ref-
erence to a social benefit expected to accrue from the conversion of
property ownership. The public use limitation thus supplies the
constitutional basis for justifying a form of treatment of a private
party by the government, the dispossession of real property, that is
otherwise morally and legally impermissible.
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Ph.D., 2003, University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., 1996, Cornell University. I am very grateful to Wendell Pritchett, Joseph
Farber, and Mandara Meyers for their very helpful comments on this manuscript.
"[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
' The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment not only applies to the federal government
but has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980) ("[The Takings Clause] applies against
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) ("[I]t seems that, since [the Fourteenth] Amendment went
into effect.., the States cannot lawfully appropriate private property ... without compensation
to the owner." (quoting Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395-96 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888))).
No other explicit enumeration of powers in the Constitution grants this power.
4 There are, of course, a great number of questions about the appropriate construction of
the just compensation requirement, but I will not delve into those issues here. For a canonical
discussion of the issue, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967) (exploring the
courts' patterns ofjustifying government interference in the marketplace).
5 I will explain some different conceptions of the notion ofjustification below. See infta Part
I.A.
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How does the notion of "public use" actually justify the practice of
takings? This Comment undertakes a theoretical and doctrinal in-
quiry into the values and interests necessary to justify a practice that
otherwise might be perceived as a deprivation of important rights.
Part I provides a general account of some of the most important ap-
proaches to justification for different kinds of social policies and then
suggests that there are aspects to the takings problem that implicate
heightened demands for political justification. Part II discusses the
Supreme Court's prevailing substantive doctrine on the public use
limitation and how the Court conceives its role in reviewing chal-
lenges to takings that are claimed to contravene the public use re-
quirement. Part III looks at how some state courts have interpreted
the public use requirement and considers the extent to which they go
beyond the minimal interpretation offered by the Supreme Court.
Part IV offers suggestions, based on some plausible approaches tojus-
tification, for how the Court might develop a more robust conception
of the public use requirement that more effectively justifies the use of
eminent domain power to those who are harmed by it.
I. THE PROBLEM OFJUSTIFYING TAKINGS
In this preliminary Part, I propose a general account of political
justification that can serve as a framework for evaluating public poli-
cies6 and then explain why takings law raises special questions for po-
litical justification, even when the taking is accompanied by the pay-
ment of compensation.
A. The Demands of PoliticalJustification
Political justification 7 is a matter of connecting social policies and
laws to principles of political morality in a way that delineates accept-
able ways of treating citizens.8 A social policy is justified, I claim,
when persons affected by it can (or should) recognize certain reasons
in favor of that policy that are of sufficient moral importance that
6 Public policies, in the general sense to which I refer to them here, are meant to encom-
pass judicial decisions as well as legislatively or administratively imposed laws and rules.
7 This discussion presupposes that the notion of political justification functions at a lower
level of abstraction than a theory ofjustice concerning the design of political institutions them-
selves.
' An example of what I take to be an important principle of political morality, furnished by
Sunstein, is "the prohibition of naked preferences," which, he claims, "captures the judicial un-
derstanding that the Constitution requires all government action to be justified by reference to
some public value." Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689,1692 (1984).
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they cannot reasonably object to them.9 Not all public policies, of
course, require the same degree of support. The demands ofjustifi-
cation vary according to what interests are at stake, what goals the
policies are meant to serve, and the extent to which individuals are
burdened by them. There is judicial recognition of the varying de-
mands for justification, for instance, in the diversity of standards that
courts use to assess different kinds of public policies. ° Not every
piece of legislation should be held to the same degree of critical scru-
tiny. Some laws are justified by the simple fact that they do some
public good. But as the social costs (whether borne individually or
collectively) of a policy rise, in terms of burdens imposed or liberties
constrained, the need forjustification increases accordingly."
In the next section I argue that takings raise difficult questions
about the proper demands of justification, and throughout the re-
mainder of this Essay I will attempt to show that the Supreme Court
has not adequately confronted these demands in its public use cases.
In order to frame this discussion, I will first describe three possible
models of public justification currently accepted within our judicial
system, each of which (we can assume) is appropriate for justifying at
least some types of public policies.
12
The first model ofjustification is weak rationality justification." This
means only that a public policy is supportable by the fact that it serves
a public end. As a form of justification, it requires only that there is
some minimal relation between a public value and a given policy. It
need not be that the means chosen is the most efficacious route to
the goal, only that it is a minimally rational choice. All that is neces-
sary is that the policy as the legislature perceives it, conduces to the
9 This formulation is indebted to T.M. Scanlon's contractualist account of moral rightness,
though my version extends the conception to an area of normative political theory with which
Scanlon's theory is not directly concerned. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER
153 (1998) ("Contractualism .... holds that an act is wrong if [it] would be disallowed by any
set of principles.., that no one could reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agree-
ment.").
'0 For example, when legislation under consideration implicates a racial classification, courts
will engage in a much more searching review than they do for economic classifications. Com-
pare, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (applying minimum ration-
ality review to an economic classification) with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications, though this was a rare case where the discrimi-
natory classification was nevertheless upheld), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-94
(1964) (invalidating a state statute that prohibited cohabitation by inter-married couples).
" Thus, in light of this country's history, racial classifications demand a more careful ex-
amination than other sorts of classifications because much more is required to justify a law bur-
dening a race.
" These models are intended to serve as touchstones for reflection upon the range of de-
mandingness that a political justification may be expected to provide. They do not exhaust the
variations that are possible or even currently accepted.
" This phrase is my own though it is derived from the standard idea of minimum rationality
review discussed immediately below.
Sept. 2004]
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public benefit, and does not merely serve private interests or embody
"naked preferences" for one group over others. 14
This form of justification is exemplified by the Supreme Court's
minimum rationality review of economic regulations. Since the
Court's repudiation of Lochner v. New York15 in the 1930s,16 the Court
has extended very limited scrutiny to legislative efforts to regulate the
economy. Even when it appears that a regulation imposes a "need-
less, wasteful requirement in many cases," 8 the potential public bene-
fit will be treated as sufficient to justify the policy.
A somewhat more demanding model of justification can be
termed cost-benefit rationality. The idea here is that the public good to
be served by a policy must positively outweigh the social costs. 9 This
goes beyond the weak rationality approach by requiring a comparison
of a policy's costs as well as benefits. It is not enough simply that
some public end is served, even if it is very well served. This model
holds that a policy is justifiable only when the aggregate social benefit
of a policy is greater than the burdens it imposes.0 The Supreme
Court has embodied this level ofjustification in decisions that call for
the use of balancing tests or proportionality concerns.2' In such
cases, the Court tends to undertake a more fact-intensive inquiry into
14 See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1689-93 (describing the prohibition of "naked preferences"
as the underlying principle for several provisions of the Constitution).
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking a state labor law limiting working
hours).
"6 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a state's
minimum wage law for women as consistent with the state's power to protect the health and
well-being of workers); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a state's au-
thority to regulate the price of milk).
17 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (holding that a state's
decision to regulate the eyeglass industry need only have a rational connection to the legisla-
ture's goal of serving the public good).
Id. at 487.
Again, these costs can be understood to encompass a variety of things such as economic
inefficiency, individual economic burdens, or constraints on liberty.
One could formulate the theory even more rigorously to require not only that the aggre-
gate benefits outweigh the costs but that the policy be the course of action that maximizes ex-
pected social utility. This formulation comes closest to following the moral theory of utilitarian-
ism. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANIsM 32-42 (A.D. Lindsay ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951)
(1863) for the classic statement of utilitarianism as an account of moral rightness within ethical
theory. While Mill did not directly advocate utilitarianism as a principle for the regulation of
political institutions and policies, it has frequently been marshaled in such a cause.
2 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough proportional-
ity" between a development exaction and the expected public benefit); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-26 (1978) (holding that several factors, including the de-
gree of economic impact and the character of government action, affect the determination of
whether a regulation constitutes a taking). Although these are both regulatory takings cases, I
mention them only for purposes of general illustration. I do not wish to imply that the reason-
ing they embody is necessarily appropriate for the logically distinct questions raised by the pub-
lic use requirement, though it may turn out to be the case after more reflection.
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the competing values at stake in order to settle how the social calcu-
lus works out. When the public benefit served by a given policy is
deemed great enough to outweigh the costs, this will constitute suffi-
cient justification.
The third, and most demanding, model of justification is that of
deontological justification. This conception suggests that there are cer-
tain social values of such fundamental importance that they cannot
be overridden by compensating public benefits, except perhaps for
the most dangerous threats to political stability or social welfare.
Many of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of
speech, worship, and assembly,2 and freedom from arbitrary arrest,
search, and intrusion on one's home, 3 can be seen to express this
sort of a limitation on permissible government action. The point is
that these interests are removed from the ordinary calculus of social
utility when the government seeks to promote the public good. Only
the most fundamental countervailing reasons will even be adequate
to justify an abrogation of these interests. Under ordinary circum-
stances, the deontological constraints require protecting the inviola-
bility of certain liberties. This model of justification is reflected, for
example, in the Court's free speech jurisprudence.24
To be sure, there are other possible forms ofjustification that can,
and often do, shape the judicial assessment of various social policies.
These three models are merely representative of a range of demand-
ingness in justification. In practice, courts are left to determine what
degree of scrutiny ought to be applied to any given issue. But judg-
ments by courts about the appropriate standard of justification, like
their judgments about whether any given standard is met, are fallible.
One role of public discourse (or even of social movements) is to call
for reconsideration of the official characterizations of certain issues
as needing more or less justification. The demands of political justi-
fication may become heightened for an issue as its broader moral
implications become more salient.
The importance of finding the proper demands ofjustification for
an issue is connected to the expressive functions of political institu-
tions. In a free, democratic society not only must there be good rea-
sons for public policies, but these reasons must be adequately con-
veyed to the citizens affected by them. Only when the basis for state
action is transparent will an open process of political discourse func-
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
24 The few recognized exceptions to freedom of speech involve advocacy of illegal action,
libel, and obscenity. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (holding that ob-
scene materials may be regulated by states and that obscenity may be defined by community
values); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that only
speech likely to incite imminent lawless action may be proscribed).
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tion as an effective check on the potential abuse of political power.
To this end, the Supreme Court plays a vital role in the process of
public justification in virtue of its role in resolving some of the most
controversial questions of public policy. The Court must not only
reach the correct result, but also provide an adequate explanation of
its reasoning. The expressive function of public justification is espe-
cially important in cases where certain parties are asked to bear a
burden that is not spread equally across the society, as, I will suggest
below, is often the case with takings.
B. The Need forJustification in Takings Law
Despite its outward similarity to other kinds of land use or eco-
nomic regulations, takings law raises special challenges for identifying
the proper demands of justification. The first reason for this is that
takings law presents a somewhat rare problem in political morality-
the state deprives on an asymmetrical basis2 goods to which private
parties otherwise have legitimate entitlement. Although the goals of
takings are ostensibly economic, they are not pursued through gen-
eral economic regulations. Rather, a taking singles out a particular,
identifiable individual to bear certain costs for the sake of social wel-
fare.2 7 Even before we identify the specific demands of justification
for policies that impose disproportionate burdens, we can recognize
it as requiring a distinctive approach from instances of general legis-
lation. Because only a limited number of individuals are asked to
bear the burden of a taking, it is important that they be provided with
adequate reasons for having to bear costs that others do not. The ba-
25 The deprivation is asymmetrical in the sense that only some citizens are affected by any
instance of taking. Takings stand in contrast to taxation, which imposes a shared burden on
society generally.
2' The entitlement is legitimate in accordance with the ordinary rules of property in a de-
mocratic society. My view does not presuppose that claims to property are morally prior to
other institutions of political society. For the classic expression of a conception of property
rights as pre-existing social institutions, see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 111
(Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
A taking clearly differs from a general economic regulation in its outward form insofar as
the former applies only to a specified party and the latter applies broadly to all persons. In
practice, of course, there may be some general regulations that have a direct impact on only a
limited set of parties. It is possible, for instance, that an environmental regulation may force
the closing of a single plant, even though it is ostensibly general in form. In such cases, the
burdens of the regulation may be borne by a limited set of persons, just as they are with a tak-
ing. Does this mean that the demands of justification should be the same for both kinds of
policies? Not necessarily. If there is a legitimate purpose to a general regulation, there is less of
a chance that specified individuals are being singled out for unfavorable treatment. Moreover,
there are fewer settled expectations about the continuity of a regulatory regime than there are
about the ownership of property. This does not mean that no justification is required to those
who are unusually burdened by a general regulation, only that it is often less difficult to provide
one. Thanks to Wendell Pritchett for raising this issue.
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sic point is that the reasons must show why it is justifiable to these per-
sons, and not merely good from the perspective of society. If it would
be reasonable for them to reject these reasons, 8 the demands ofjusti-
fication will not have been met.
The second reason why takings raise a distinctive demand for jus-
tification derives from the imperfectly fungible nature of property.2"
Despite the requirement of just compensation in the Takings Clause,
there are reasons to suggest that a payment for the market value of
the property will not always redress the harm of dispossession. First, a
taking may frustrate the economic interests or expectations that a
person may have in her property, such as long-term plans for business
development.0 The market for like-kinds may have risen so much
that a party who had been paid compensation for a taking may be
unable to find an adequate replacement. Second, a taking may frus-
trate a variety of personal, intangible interests that cannot be restored
through compensation. As Michelman puts it, "property may repre-
sent more than money because it may represent things that money
itself can't buy-place, position, relationship, roots, community, soli-
darity, status ... and security .... .. ' When a person (or family) is dis-
possessed by a taking, the connections she has to her community may
be severed in a fundamental way. Moreover, if the purpose of the
taking is to transform the use of the property, this use may detrimen-
tally alter the nature of the surrounding community that remains.
Given that the exercise of the takings power involves the imposi-
tion of asymmetrical burdens that may be insusceptible to complete
28 See SCANLON, supra note 9, at 195 (describing how the notion of reasonable rejection can
function as a basis for assessing a proposed principle of morality). On Scanlon's view, if the
principle would sanction the imposition of burdens to which a person reasonably could object,
this is prima facie grounds for suggesting that an act performed under that principle would be
wrong.
See MARGARETJANE RADIN, Property and Personhood, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35, 40-43
(1993) (describing property from the perspective of its association with one's own body or be-
ing).
m This concern is reflected in the common law of contracts that allows specific performance
of sales of real property. See, e.g., Loveless v. Diehl, 364 S.W.2d 317, 320-21 (Ark. 1963) (grant-
ing specific performance to a purchaser who had already made substantial improvements to the
property as a lessee); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 (1981).
"1 Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1112
(1981).
" Radin claims even more broadly that property can play a role in how "we constitute our-
selves as continuing personal entities in the world." RADIN, supra note 29, at 36. To the extent
that property has this personal value, compensation for a taking still will not make a person
whole. Radin's position may suggest the claim that when property is so meaningful to a person
it should never be taken. RADIN, supra note 29, at 53, 65 (suggesting that takings of property
with a more "personal," rather than "fungible," character may be less easily justified). I am mak-
ing a weaker claim to the effect that the potential harm to individuals creates a heightened de-
mand for justification, but I do not advocate a categorical bar to takings when the subjective
value of a person's property is great enough.
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redress, adequate justification must be provided. The importance of
people's interests in their own property suggests, initially, that some-
thing more than weak rationality will be required to provide an ade-
quate justification to those who are burdened by a taking. Because
the Public Use Clause serves as the potential locus of a political justi-
fication, a great deal rests on its construction. It remains to be seen
whether the prevailing public use doctrine goes far enough toward
fulfilling this justificatory role.
II. THE IDEA OF "PUBLIC USE" IN TAKINGSJURISPRUDENCE
There are two dimensions to the issue of how to interpret the Pub-
lic Use Clause. First, what is the proper substantive interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment's "public use" limitation? Or simply, what uses
are genuinely public ones? Second, what role should courts play in
reviewing takings not manifestly of a public character? That is, what
standard of scrutiny should they apply? The following two sections
address how the Supreme Court has resolved these issues. Part II.C
then evaluates the Court's prevailing approach in light of the con-
cerns about the justification adduced above.
A. Public Use as a Substantive Standard
Historically there have been two dominant ways of construing the
public use requirement that have alternately found favor with the Su-
preme Court. The first approach interprets the requirement nar-
rowly, meaning fairly literally "use by the public. 34 A taking satisfies
this requirement only if the real property is transferred from its pri-
vate owner to a public entity that uses it directly to serve some public
function, such as highways or government buildings.3 5 Despite the in-
tuitive plausibility of this interpretation, it has long been repudiated
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 6 By 1916,Justice Holmes declared
33 See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 205-16 (1978) (tracing the shifting social and judicial history of the broad and narrow in-
terpretations of the public use requirement).
See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 603 (1949) (discussing the two constructions of the public use test-the narrow "use by
the public" requirement, where the property is converted to a purpose in which the public has a
right of use, and a broad version involving a "purpose beneficial to the public," where the use of
the property may make an "indirect contribution to the prosperity of the community" but it
does not involve a general license of the public to use the property).
35 Id.
See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (sustaining the con-
demnation of a right of way for a mining company to construct an aerial bucket line for trans-
porting ore down a mountainside); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (affirming a state law
allowing the condemnation of a right of way to provide irrigation to adjacent parcels despite the
fact that this might only benefit an individual property owner). In both of these cases the Court
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for the Court that "[t] he inadequacy of use by the general public as a
universal test is established.01
The second, currently prevailing, interpretation of the Public Use
Clause construes it to require only that some kind of "public pur-
pose" is served by the transfer of property: "one person's private
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person
without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be
paid.03 8 In principle, this requirement does not proscribe the state
from effecting a transfer of property from one private person to an-
other. The result of a taking need not be that the government subse-
quently holds the real property, or even that the public gains a right
of use to the property.8 The idea of public purpose is construed
broadly, but the resulting boundaries of the Public Use Clause appear
to be more indeterminate than under the narrow construction. It
remains uncertain as to what counts as an adequate public purpose to
justify the disruption of an individual's claims to her property.
In the past fifty years, two significant Supreme Court cases have af-
firmed this expansive interpretation of the public use requirement-
Berman v. Parkero and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff The re-
mainder of this section discusses these two cases in some detail in or-
der to describe their unique factual contexts and to highlight the
dramatic scope of property dispossession that occurred in both in-
stances.
In Berman v. Parker the Court upheld the use of eminent domain
in a large-scale redevelopment project in several neighborhoods
throughout the District of Columbia. ' Congress had established the
Redevelopment Land Agency and gave it power of eminent domain
to acquire and assemble land for redevelopment of slums and
blighted areas according to an area-wide plan. 3 The plan called for
giving preference to private enterprises, rather than public agencies,
to do the groundwork of redevelopment according to the plan certi-
indicated that the decision of whether there is an adequate justifying public use depends on a
close scrutiny of the relevant facts of each case, a task that is best left to state legislatures and
courts familiar with the material circumstances. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531; Clark, 198 U.S. at 370.
As the ensuing discussion will show, the Supreme Court continues to endorse such a policy of
deference to legislative decisions about public use.
" Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32
(1916) (sustaining the taking of land for the construction of a dam by a power company).
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (emphasis added).
Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, supra note 34,
at 603.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
12 348 U.S. at 28-30, 36.
3 Id. at 28-29.
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fledby aplaning • .44fled by a planning commission. The owner of a department store in
the target area, which was not itself blighted, challenged the pro-
posed taking of his property as violating the public use requirement.
45
His primary objection was that his property was to be taken and sim-
ply transferred to another businessman, violating the constraint
against purely private transfers.46
The Court found that there was an adequate justifying public
purpose for the taking-the elimination of slums and blight needed
to bring about a general improvement in the public welfare in the
area.4 1 Congress had found that the targeted areas were character-
ized by substandard, overcrowded housing, and unsanitary condi-
tions.4 s The Court affirmed that Congress was generally entitled to
address these sorts of social problems, given its constitutionally-
delegated authority. And "[o] nce the object is within the authority of
Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent do-
main is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means
to the end."49 The fact that the transaction involved what was effec-
tively a private transfer did not trouble the Court, so long as it was an
incidental part of the broader redevelopment plan. Provided that
there is an identifiable public purpose, the Court held, such private
transfers are not strictly forbidden.50 Once it is settled that Congress
has the authority to legislate in some given area, and to use the power
of eminent domain to accomplish its objectives, the Court indicated
that it would not second-guess the approach that Congress deemed to
be most effective. "We cannot say that public ownership is the sole
method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelop-
ment projects."'"
In its most important holding, Berman articulated the broad stan-
dard for establishing what constitutes an acceptable public purpose.
"We deal... with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruit-
less, for each case must turn on its own facts.5 2 This holding gives
legislatures tremendous discretion to use the power of eminent do-
main to advance whatever they perceive to be within the public good.
Nor was the Court equivocal about precisely how much latitude it in-
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
" Id. at 28.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
See id. (remarking that Congress may conclude that the public end may be better served
through private enterprise).
5' Id. at 32.
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tended to extend to legislative determinations of what constitutes the
public good. Rather, it provided an especially expansive and colorful
description of what may be involved:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.... If those who govern the Dis-
trict of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in
the way.53
Evidently, then, the Berman Court perceived the public use require-
ment not to constitute a significant constraint on the use of eminent
domain to dispossess private parties of their property so long as the
legislature employed the power to address any matter within its gov-
erning authority. So long as there was a legislative decision that the
public welfare ought to be served in this particular manner, this was
thought to be adequate justification for the taking.
Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff the Court
reaffirmed Berman's broad construction of the Takings Clause in reit-
erating that "[t] he 'public use' requirement is ... coterminous with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers. 54 This case involved the use
of eminent domain by the Hawaii legislature in its efforts to address
what it found to be an excessive concentration of land ownership in
the hands of a few private landowners. Extending back to a feudal
land tenure system from the era of island chiefs, the legislature
found, ownership had become so restricted by the mid-1960s that
forty-nine percent of the state's land was owned by the state and fed-
eral governments, and another forty-seven percent was owned by only
seventy-two private landowners. 56 The legislature determined that
this distribution "was responsible for skewing the State's residential
fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tran-
quility and welfare." 57 Rather than owning the land, many people
owned houses and leased the land upon which their houses sat.5 Pri-
vate landowners were resistant to selling their parcels because of the
federal tax burdens likely to ensue.59 The legislature decided to make
I /d. at 33 (citations omitted).
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
5 Id. at 232.
Id. Moreover, "on Oahu, the most urbanized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5%
of the fee simple titles." Id.
57 id.
b8 See id. at 233 (observing that the law was aimed at homeowners who rented the land upon
which their houses were built).
Id.
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the land sales involuntary by condemning a property and offering it
for sale only to its current occupants.6° This strategy diminished the
federal tax consequences to the current owners, while still achieving
the redistribution of fees simple.6'
The Ninth Circuit had found that the transfers violated the Public
Use Clause because their primary benefit accrued to the individual
lessees who were enabled to purchase property. It held that the Act
was "a naked attempt" to redistribute private property for the private
63benefit and use of the transferee.
The Supreme Court, however, was untroubled by Hawaii's land
transfer program, despite the fact that it compelled what were essen-
tially private transfers between individuals:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is trans-
ferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn the
taking as having only a private purpose.... [G]overnment does not itself
have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's pur-
pose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
Clause.64
Once again, the Court was concerned only in finding whether the
legislature had articulated apublic rationale for its policies that could
be said to advance the general welfare. But because the state is free
to use the mechanism of eminent domain to advance any goal within
its police power, the public use requirement provides weak con-
straints. 65 The broader legislative purpose of the Act, "[r]egulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it, '66 was sufficiently general a
goal to fall within the state's police power. Thus, "[r]edistribution of
fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the
state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exer-
cise of the eminent domain power.,
67
The Court held that the only circumstance in which even a com-
pensated taking would be forbidden would be if the legislature had
acted "for no reason other than to confer a private benefit on a par-
ticular private party." Under this interpretation, the only purposes
W0 Id. The state also empowered the housing authority to assist the lessees to purchase the
properties by lending them up to ninety percent of the purchase price. Id. at 234.
M1 Id. The Court did not explain why an involuntary sale of the property would have "less
severe" federal tax consequences, though it indicated that many owners would be more willing
to sell their land if the tax burden were lessened. Id.
62 Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983).
63 Id.
Midkiff 467 U.S. at 243-44 (1984).
See id. at 242-43 (stating that even if the law does not achieve its stated goals, as long as
such goals are part of a rational exercise of eminent domain power, the law is constitutional).
" Id. at 242.
67 Id. at 243.
Id. at 245.
[Vol. 7:1
Sept. 2004] "PUBLIC USE" AND THEJUSTIFICA TION OF TAKINGS
that the "Public Use" Clause bars are those that simply give prefer-
ence to one party at the expense of another without any broader pub-
lic rationale. "A purely private taking could not withstand the scru-
tiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate
purpose of government and would thus be void."69
As Berman attests, however, the legitimate purposes of government
are quite expansive and apparently growing all the time. So long as
there is a legislative determination that a policy will serve the public
good in some respect, there may be no social policy or program that
would fail to meet the Court's standard.7 ' As a substantive constitu-
tional standard, the public use requirement (construed in this fash-
ion) imposes only the most limited demands on the government to
justify its actions dispossessing individuals of their property interests.72
Berman and Midkiff together stand for the proposition that so long
as there is some legitimating public benefit to the taking and transfer
of land, it does not matter how important that purpose is, how severe
a deprivation the taking will inflict, or if there are disproportions be-
tween public benefits and private benefits and harms. Even if private
parties benefit from a taking to a far greater extent than the public
welfare is improved, Midkiff provides no grounds for overturning the
result.
Berman and Midkiff can be seen as clear instances of the Court ap-
plying a model of weak rationality justification, as I characterized it
above. The Court looks only to determine whether the taking is "ra-
tionally related to a conceivable public purpose, 74 and if it is so re-
lated, treats this end as sufficient to justify the action. The Court
thereby extends the minimum rationality standard of review applica-
ble to questions of economic regulation to the arena of takings law.
As I have also suggested above,7' however, there are theoretical rea-
sons for preferring a more demanding form of justification for the
69 Id.
'0 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("The concept of public welfare is broad and
indefinite.").
" As Midkiffnotes, "where the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by
the Public Use Clause." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. Admittedly, the Court may accord less defer-
ence to lesser public agencies with eminent domain power that act without relying on explicit
legislative findings. See, e.g., Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445, 464 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Because the Plan Commission has not relied on a legislative determination of public use, the
traditional deference given to those determinations is not appropriate in this case.").
'2 Some scholars would even suggest that the Court's interpretation of the requirement has
removed it from the practice of justification entirely. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 61 (1986) ("[M]ost observers today think the public use limi-
tation is a dead letter.").
73 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
75 See supra Part 1.B.
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taking of property. A weak rationality standard does not show proper
regard for the concerns of the individuals who are most burdened by
a social policy.
B. The Role of the Judiciary in Scrutinizing Public Use Determinations
Along with its spare substantive interpretation of the public use
requirement, the Court has also indicated a correlative policy ofjudi-
76cial deference toward legislative decisions over these questions.
Throughout public use cases over the past century, the Court has
perceived its role in reviewing such determinations of public purpose
to be quite limited." For the most part, legislatures are left to deter-
mine the scope of their own power to affect the public good, includ-
ing the use of eminent domain. "The role of the judiciary in deter-
mining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is
an extremely narrow one."'  How narrow exactly? The Court fre-
quently alludes to some early cryptic principles: a court should not
substitute its judment "unless the use be palpably without reason-
able foundation , and deference to the legislature is required "until
[Congress's intention] is shown to involve an impossibility. '" s° These
explanations are not exactly edifying, though they serve as further
evidence that the Court believes that only the weakest rationale is
necessary tojustify a taking.
The Court has tended to offer one basic type of reason for its pol-
icy of near-total judicial deference in this area: "U]udicial deference
is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are bet-
ter able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an ex-
ercise of the taking power. 8' Presumably legislatures are better ac-
quainted with the particular circumstances in which the taking is
contemplated ("the facts surrounding the subject," in Justice
Peckam's words), 2 and can assess whether a taking will be necessary
to achieve the optimal solution in that case. If courts were eager to
upset such determinations, they would presumably be injecting some
arbitrary principle into an arena that calls for fact-specific inquiry.
"Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts de-
7' See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.).
77 This approach, which well-preceded Berman, can be found in United States ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269
U.S. 55, 66 (1925), and United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). See
infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 680.
" Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66; see also Welch, 327 U.S. at 552 (quoting Old Dominion
Land Co., 269 U.S. at 56.).
" Midkiff 467 U.S. at 244.
12 Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905).
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ciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their in-
validating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the
moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in
other fields."'83
To be sure, there have been some dissenting views on the policy of
judicial deference to legislative determinations of what is an appro-
priate public use. In Welch, Justice Reed insisted that the question of
whether a taking is for a public purpose is always finally a judicial
question :14
Of course the legislative or administrative determination has great weight
but the constitutional doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be un-
duly restricted if an administrative agency could invoke a so-called politi-
cal power so as to immunize its action against judicial examination in
contests between the agency and the citizen. 5
While Midkiff does not wholly disavow judicial scrutiny, the Court's
current policy is significantly more lenient than these dissenting views
would have it.
As Berman explains it, "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limita-
tions, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation.8 8  This stance highlights the distance the
Court perceives between the set of liberties it affords great care in
scrutinizing (and the lack of deference to the legislature in those in-
stances) s7 and the interests in property that are at stake when the gov-
ernment exercises its takings power. The Court's policy of deference
may appear perfectly reasonable if we agree with its conclusions on
the substantive standard. But if there are grounds for suggesting a
need for a more rigorous form ofjustification for instances of takings,
the Court may have abdicated its role as a source of constitutional
83 Welch, 327 U.S. at 552 (sustaining the condemnation of private property by the Tennessee
Valley Authority in a remote area whose access highway was flooded by the creation of a new
dam reservoir).
Id. at 556-57 (Reed,J., concurring).
Id. See also justice Frankfurter's concurrence:
This Court has never deviated from the view that under the Constitution a claim that a
taking is not 'for public use' is open for judicial consideration, ultimately by this Court.
It is equally true that in the numerous cases in which the issue was adjudicated, this
Court never found that legislative determination that the use was 'public' exceeded Con-
stitutional bounds. But the fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative
determination nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power to re-
view is wanting.... [W]hether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond
judicial competence.
Id. at 557-58 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
m Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (emphasis added).
87 As in the cases where fundamental liberties of speech and political participation are im-
plicated. See supra note 24.
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oversight. Judicial review is precisely what is wanted when important
liberties are at stake or the demands of political justification are not
trivial. If, as I will show below, there are important interests to be
protected, there is reason for the Court to engage itself more seri-
ously in a consideration of these concerns."
C. Raising the Demand forJustification in Takings
The results in Berman and Midkiff suggesting that the mere pres-
ence of a conceivable public purpose is sufficient to justify a taking,
conflict with the two considerations (asymmetry of burdens and im-
perfect fungibility of property)89 that suggest that takings require a
more rigorous form of justification. The version of weak rationality
justification offered by the Court does not satisfy the more stringent
demand for justification that takings seem, at least theoretically, to
require.
As it stands, the weak rationality standard of justification would
sanction a taking that has only slight public benefits regardless of how
great its costs are. Recall the expansive construction of public pur-
poses in Berman, which went so far as to prescribe virtually any legisla-
tive efforts to promote aesthetic and spiritual well-being in the com-
munity, and held that "there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
stands in the way.""w Suppose a legislature finds that planting flowers
along highways tends to produce slight decreases in the incidence of
highway traffic accidents because of the theoretically beneficial ef-
fects of flowers on stress levels. It decides that there is one neighbor-
hood of row homes near the exit ramps that has been an especially
frequent site of accidents, including one fatality several years ago.
The legislature decides to condemn the entire neighborhood, raze
the homes of 200 families, and turn the area into a beautiful garden.
9
There is nothing within the broad principles of Berman and Midkiff to
rule out this kind of legislative initiative. There is a clear public pur-
pose, traffic safety and public health, which no court has denied is
within the purview of a state's police powers. Moreover, it is not a
8 What underlies this suggestion may even be characterized as a concern with ensuring the
availability of procedural due process. If courts are too deferential to legislative policies that
have the potential to harm discrete populations, there is a danger that these persons will be de-
nied the chance to have their concerns fully and carefully considered in an impartial forum.
See supra Part LB.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
9' This example is admittedly stylized in order to draw out the logical implications of the
principle under consideration, but it is not entirely without basis in reality. The Berman holding
has vindicated various forms of aesthetic takings, including scenic easements along highways
that prevent landowners from using or altering their property in different ways. See Berger, su-
pra note 33, at 222 (discussing cases involving highway beautification).
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case of a purely private taking, as the land is not transferred for the
benefit of any private party.
The intuition here, however, is that there is something deeply un-
justifiable about forcing so many farriilies out of their homes for such
small improvements to the public welfare. The aggregate burden on
the dispossessed residents, no doubt, far exceeds the expected bene-
fits. Notice that this hypothetical scenario stands in contrast to the
real facts in Berman, in which the public purpose to be served was sig-
nificantly more substantial than slight increases in traffic safety.
Given the weightiness of the interests at stake, it is plausible to say
that Berman's result was consistent with the more stringent demands
for justification required by the cost-benefit rationality standard. But
it does not follow from this result that absolutely any improvement to
public welfare will justify the use of eminent domain. The Berman
Court generalized its specific holding into a sweeping principle with-
out showing why the demands of justification for a taking should be
set so low. The doctrine is overly broad because the kinds of meas-
ures that would be acceptable to address urgent social ills would not
always be equally legitimate means to address every conceivable legis-
lative purpose directed at the public good,; irrespective of the costs
that these measures might impose.
The underlying problems with Berman and Midkiff are not their
specific results but rather their general policy of validating a taking
based on only one kind of relevant consideration among many. Not
all public purposes are equally important, but these two cases treat
them as if they are. In doing so, the Court overlooks the fact that the
justification of publicly-imposed burdens requires a more thorough
assessment of the weight of all relevant interests. It is doubtful that
any marginal improvement in public welfare, such as making the
roads a little more safe93 or making a neighborhood a little more
92 We can note that Midkiff presents a significantly harder case on the facts. The hardships
that the legislature was attempting to remedy were obviously not as dire, for there were no bur-
dens other than the high cost of land ownership. Nevertheless, a careful accounting of the pub-
lic benefits and the harms to the landowners might have supported the same result, even on
this more demanding standard of justification. Again, it is plausible to say that the result was a
correct one, but it is a closer call. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1984)
(highlighting the disparate proportion of landowners).
9' This rationale was suggested in Frustaci v. City of South Portland, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13635, at *17 (D. Me. 2000). This case did not actually involve the use of eminent domain, but
rather involved a claimed regulatory taking. The plaintiff asserted that a municipality's decision
to discontinue development of streets near his property denied him the opportunity to develop
his property into a twenty-unit subdivision, effecting a regulatory taking. In sustaining motions
to dismiss the plaintiffs claims, the court held that "[a] judgment that discontinuance of a road
abutting a planned subdivision could advance these public purposes is not palpably lacking in
reasonable foundation." Id. at *18.
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beautiful,9 4 can always justify the imposition of harms as serious as the
dispossession of homes and businesses.
This argument only goes so far as to suggest that, at the very least,
something closer to the cost-benefit approach to justification is re-
quired for takings. This standard would hold that an exercise of
eminent domain is justified only if the public benefits are demon-
strably greater than the costs imposed on the harmed parties. It is a
more acceptable minimum than the weak rationality standard be-
cause it recognizes that other interests ought to be considered against
the value of the intended public purpose. The weak rationality ap-
proach allows the concerns of the dispossessed parties to be disre-
garded entirely. Yet the recognition of non-fungible, personal inter-
ests that individuals often have in property provides an important
reason for courts to engage in a more thorough inquiry. By applying
the more demanding standard of cost-benefit rationality to these
problems, courts would afford those potentially harmed by a taking
the opportunity to demonstrate the importance of their personal in-
terests that are threatened.
Although this argument is sufficient to show that the current pub-
lic use doctrine sets the standard for justification too low, it does not
settle the question of how high it should be. Even cost-benefit ra-
tionality may turn out to be an insufficient justification for a taking, at
least in some cases. I will return to this question 95 after first consider-
ing some more recent lower court decisions interpreting the re-
quirement of public use.
III. POST-MiDKzbFDEVELOPMENTS IN LOWER COURTS
The basic doctrine articulated in Midkiff that a public use can be
found whenever there is a conceivable public purpose for a taking,
still leaves lower courts with some latitude to fill in the contours of
the doctrine at the margins of public and private benefits. That is,
there is room to invalidate a taking if it is performed "for no reason
other than to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.
9 6
Some lower court decisions may suggest some useful ways to resolve
disagreements over what is a legitimate public use. Although there is
no direct resistance to the Supreme Court's minimal standard for jus-
tifying a taking, the analysis of certain cases sometimes indicates a
concern to provide a more thorough evaluation of competing inter-
ests than prevailing doctrine requires. The following inquiry first
As suggested by Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
95 See infta Part IV.
N Midkiff 467 U.S. at 244.
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looks at cases where courts have found no violation of a public use
standard and then those where they have found such a violation. 97
A. Affirmation of Public Uses and Purposes
Courts consistently recognize certain social policies to fall squarely
within the boundaries of the public use requirement. Primary among
these policies are programs to eliminate slums and blight, where
there is manifest deterioration of a neighborhood and limited pros-
pects for economic revitalization without significant intervention.
The redevelopment of Times Square in New York City, for instance,
gave rise to a recent takings challenge on public use grounds.98 A
public redevelopment authority intended to condemn privately
owned land and lease it to the New York Times, which would build a
new office tower for its headquarters. 9  The redevelopment scheme
would benefit the public by adding needed office and commercial
space, increasing retail revenue, revitalizing the economic prospects
of the area and driving out blight and crime.'0° In affirming the use
of eminent domain, the appeals court held that "[v]irtually all of the
anticipated outcomes of this project clearly serve a public purpose by
eliminating a pernicious blight which has impaired the economic de-
velopment of a midtown Manhattan neighborhood."'0 ' The court
validated the exercise of eminent domain as being rationally related
to the conceivable public purpose of reducing blight in the area, de-
spite the benefits to private parties that it would confer.102 A similar
rationale is typically offered in other urban renewal cases involving
the use of eminent domain. 
103
97 Note that the cases discussed in this section are all state cases, and as such are primarily
concerned with the version of the public use clause found in their respective state constitutions.
Although the content of the state and federal takings clauses are often "substantially similar," see
Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Mich. 2001), state courts will have the prerogative to
interpret the state public use requirement as they see fit. Their results do not directly follow
from Midkiffs interpretation of the federal public use clause. My purpose in discussing these
various cases is not to show how the Federal Constitution has been construed, but rather differ-
ent variations of how it might be so construed.
98 W. 41st St. Realty LLC v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002).
Id. at 124.
IN Id.
'0' Id. at 126.
"' Id. Note that in this case, similar to the situation in Berman, the city's approach to rede-
velopment explicitly relied on an approach "that affords maximum participation by private en-
terprise." Id. at 124.
, ' See, e.g., Crompton Corp. v. City of Dubuque, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10653, at *9 (N.D.
Iowa 2001) (dismissing on the pleadings a public use challenge to an urban renewal taking);
City of Dayton v. Kuntz, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 747, at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) ("[A] city's
decision to appropriate blighted or deteriorating land for an urban renewal project intended to
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Other public purposes found sufficient to justify the use of emi-
nent domain include concerns for public safety and traffic regulation
because they "fall within the scope of sovereign police power.' 04 A
public purpose has also been found in the condemnation of a right
of way to obtain access to a landlocked parcel.' 05 Despite the appear-
ance that the benefit of such a taking accrues only to a particular in-
dividual, the court found the public purposes to include "'preserving
and enhancing the value, promoting the owner's full and lawful use
and enjoyment of his property, and serving the public interest by put-
ing the citizen in the position to perform public services.", 0 6 In this
fashion, lower courts often follow the broad mandate of the Supreme
Court's public use doctrine, allowing the use of eminent domain
whenever there is a nexus with a conceivable public purpose, even if
there is a distant relationship between the good to be served (such as
traffic safety or public service) and the mechanism of dispossessing
individuals from their real property.
B. Violations of the Public Use Limitation
There are a number of instances where courts have found a taking
actually to violate the Public Use Clause, even when the reasons prof-
fered are quite similar to those endorsed in other cases. Berman and
Midkiff, of course, did not advocate total deference to all uses of emi-
nent domain, prescribing only a "narrow" scope ofjudicial scrutiny to
overturn takings that effect purely private transfers. 0 7 Although Mid-
kiff did not make perfectly clear what constitutes such a narrow scope,
some subsequent cases purport to fall within this area. In 99 Cents
Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,"' the court found that the
proposed taking would be a purely private transfer motivated by pres-
sure from a large store threatening to leave the municipality.
10 9
Costco, the anchor store in a shopping center, wanted to expand its
operations into the commercial space adjacent to it rather than con-
struct a separate addition."0 The city attempted to justify the transfer
in terms of the economic benefits of protecting the existing center,
but the court rejected the city's explanation as being "demonstrably
rejuvenate a downtown area is conducive to the public welfare and constitutes a 'public
use' .... ).
,o See Frustaci v. City of S. Portland, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13635, at *17 (D. Me. 2000) (sug-
gesting that concerns for traffic safety could justify a decision not to extend a road to undevel-
oped property).
Lockridge v. Adrian, 638 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1994).
Id. at 771 (quoting Steele v. County Comm'rs, 3 So. 761, 763 (Ala. 1887)).
107 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1983).
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
, Id. at 1129.
11 Id. at 1126.
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pretextual," and found that its worries about the possibility of "future
blight" if Costco were to leave the shopping center to be an implausi-
ble public concern. I" The court characterized this case as falling
squarely within the narrow scope ofjudicial scrutiny, left uncertain by
Midkiffl to protect property owners from purely private transfers." 2
Nevertheless, not every case in which the Public Use Clause is held
to be violated is quite so clear a case of purely private benefit. Even
when there is some plausibility to the proffered rationale of the bene-
fits of economic development, courts are not always persuaded that a
public interest is being served to an appropriate extent. Cases indi-
cate that courts are sometimes inclined to apply a higher standard of
justification than the minimal rationality scrutiny of Midkiff In
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environ-
mental,"' a case with some factual resemblances to Berman and Midkiff
the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a proposed taking that would
have transferred land from a private recycling business to an adjacent
racetrack so the business could expand its parking capacity." The
recycling center was not at the time using the land proposed to be
transferred, but had long-term business plans to do so as other por-
tions of its property were used up as a landfill.1 1 5 One rationale of-
fered in support of the transfer was that the development would in-
crease the tax base and generate more revenues, which in turn could
be used to enhance public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
fare.1 6 Another was that the new parking lot would improve traffic
patterns on nearby highways during high-volume race days, decreas-
ing the safety hazard caused by congestion."7
Despite "acknowledg[ing] that a public use or purpose may be sat-
isfied in light of public safety concerns"1 8 and "recogniz[ing] that
economic development is an important public purpose," 9 the court
nevertheless found that the transfer was primarily of a private charac-
ter, whose principal benefit would accrue to the racetrack and to its
customers. Because the racetrack did have the alternative, albeit a
more expensive one, of building a parking garage on property it al-
ready owned, " [t]his condemnation clearly was intended to assist [the
Id. at 1129,1130.
12 Id. at 1129.
3 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002).
.. Id. at 4. It is noteworthy that the racetrack was initially built in an area targeted for eco-
nomic revitalization and was expressly chosen as a method of increasing revenues in the area.
The track turned out to be even more popular than anticipated.
115 Id.
116 Id.
l17 Id.
.S Id. at 9.
119 Id.
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racetrack] in accomplishing [its] goals in a swift, economical, and
profitable manner."1  In the end, the potential gains to the public
welfare simply were not compelling enough to warrant the taking.
"While we do not deny that this expansion in revenue could poten-
tially trickle down and bring corresponding revenue increases to the
region, revenue expansion alone does not justify an improper and
unacceptable expansion of the eminent domain power of the gov-
ernment.'.'.
The practice of condemnation of land for providing rights of way
to landlocked parcels has also come under question as a legitimate
public use. In Tolksdorf v. Griffith22 the Michigan Supreme Court
struck down a state law allowing the compulsion of such private trans-
fers. 23 It held that when a taking benefits private interests, "a court
inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is
the predominant interest being advanced.'2 4 If there are "speculative
or marginal" benefits to the public from this policy, but the interest
served is predominantly a private one, the taking is impermissible.
25
Here, the policy of promoting the beneficial use of land did not out-
weigh the fact that primarily private interests were being served.
2 6
By characterizing a proposed taking as having primarily private
benefits, these cases effectively raise the demands of justification.
This is possible because of the logical connection between public and
private benefits, and the lack of any sharp distinction between them.
The good of the public is, logically, some form of aggregation of pri-
vate good. Private benefits rarely work in total opposition to the pub-
lic good. So even if something, such as an easement for a landlocked
parcel, appears to benefit exactly one person, it may have effects on
the productive use and overall value of land that can be characterized
in more broadly public terms. The judgment of whether something
constitutes a purely private transfer thus is able to bring in considera-
tions of the sort required by cost-benefit rationality without explicitly
acknowledging as much. In this fashion, at least some lower courts
indicate a willingness to engage in a more thorough balancing of
competing considerations than that required by Midkiffs weak ra-
tionality approach. This involves not only identifying a conceivable
' Id. at 10.
1 Id. at 10-11.
"2 626 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 2001).
'" Id. at 169.
124 Id. at 168 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60
(Mich. 1981).
12' Id.
1' The court did note that its holding did not preclude common law principles of prescrip-
tive easements or easements by necessity from applying. It simply rejected a statutory mecha-
nism for achieving this result. Id.
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public purpose but looking to the relationship between the asserted
public purpose, the importance of eminent domain to that end, and
the private interests at stake. This kind of approach embodies a more
demanding standard for the justification of takings.
IV. JUSTIFYING THE BURDENS OF TAKING
In this final Part, I examine some alternative proposals for con-
struing the public use requirement and identify some fundamental
considerations to be employed in an adequate justification of takings.
The various proposals each have some connection to the different
abstract models of political justification described in Part I, though I
now try to develop them with specific reference to the actual prob-
lems of takings. Each of the following proposals looks to give a more
stringent content to the public use requirement, and calls for the in-
validation of more than only the most blatant private transfers. Ac-
cepting any of these approaches calls for a correspondingly more rig-
orous judicial inquiry than the Supreme Court now advises for
takings claims, though the nature of the inquiry will vary significantly
with each.
A. Some Approaches to Heightened Justification
One approach toward refining the public use requirement might
attempt to amplify the distinction between takings that serve predomi-
nantly public or predominantly private ends.27 It would suggest that a
taking is justified whenever public benefits can be said to predomi-
nate over private ones. If the primary good to be achieved is broad-
based, but it happens also to confer private benefits on certain par-
ties, this will not disqualify the taking as long as achieving the public
benefit was not a pretext for a private goal. This approach is a closer
variant of weak rationality than cost-benefit rationality, because it
seeks only to compare the possible benefits of a taking, while still dis-
regarding the burdens imposed on those who are dispossessed. It
calls upon courts merely to make factual inquiries about the likely
consequences of the taking to those who stand to benefit from it.
Where there are dual public and private benefits expected, courts are
to ensure that the public benefits are not merely "speculative or mar-
ginal"' 28 relative to the private interest served. The primary motiva-
127 This approach would basically attempt to impart more substantive content to Midkiffs
proscription of "purely private takings" by expanding the notion of what "purely private" means.
2. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 ("[P]ublic benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must
be clear and significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature."),
overruled on other grounds by County of Wayne v. Hatcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). Poletown
was a very significant state public use case in the period before Midkiff, confronting a proposed
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tion of this approach is to avoid using public power for largely private
gain. While this approach represents an advance over the weak ra-
tionality doctrine in Midkiff it similarly fails to take into account the
significance of the burdens on the dispossessed occupants of prop-
erty. It is to those whom are harmed by a policy that a justification
should be addressed. While it is important to avoid using govern-
ment power for the private benefit of certain individuals, this is not
the most fundamental moral concern at stake.
A second approach might suggest that courts attempt to articulate
a limited, but paradigmatic set of public purposes for which the use
of eminent domain is categorically permitted.129 For instance, the
goal of eliminatin0 slums and blight might always legitimate the use
of takings power. Southwestern Illinois suggested something along
these lines in maintaining that "[c]learly, the taking of slums and
blighted areas is permitted for the purposes of clearance and rede-
,,131'velopment, regardless of the subsequent use of the property, even
when it rejected a more general economic benefit rationale. Eco-
nomic revitalization to combat circumstances of deterioration would
be acceptable; but the mere possibility of general economic growth
will not be a sufficiently defined goal to justify a taking.3 2 This ap-
proach would rest on a presumption that the social benefits of slum
clearance and blight removal almost certainly outweigh the particular
harms created by a taking. In relying on such a presumption, this
approach does not guarantee that courts will always carefully consider
the interests at stake to be certain that the benefits are substantial
enough to vindicate the taking of property. It would be a form of
cost-benefit rationality only as a higher-order principle that will usu-
ally, though not necessarily, achieve the correct cost-benefit result.
This approach is even more demanding than the cost-benefit ration-
ality model because it restricts the set of social benefits that can justify
a taking only to a few kinds of public benefits. It would not consider
taking that would assemble land for the development of a new General Motors plant. It exem-
plifies the "predominance of the public interest" approach described here and upheld the pro-
posed taking in light of the significant expected public benefit of "alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community." Id. at 459.
' This list would extend beyond those uses that fall under the original "use by the public"
criterion, such as road building and public facilities, to encompass some but not all previously
recognized public purposes.
I will return to consider whether this strategy raises special concerns about the possibly
disproportionate impact it may have on racial minorities or other disadvantaged populations.
Thanks to Mandara Meyers for suggesting this important concern.
... S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2002).
" The fact that there will be some commercial development, by itself, would be insufficient
to justify a taking from one business to give to another. Southwestern Illinois notes that every law-
ful business contributes to economic growth, in some sense, so a harm to one lawful business
cannot be justified on this ground. Id.
[Vol. 7:1
Sept. 2004] -PUBLIC USE" AND THEJUSTJFICATION OF TAKINGS 273
a taking to be justified if it accomplished entirely different social ob-
jectives. This fact is the main drawback to the viability of this ap-
proach as a guiding principle of constitutional adjudication. There is
no reason to narrow the concept of public use so greatly, nor is there
any textual or judicial basis for supposing that the use of takings be
limited to achieving one form of public benefit (removing slums and
blight), but no others.
A third approach could be formulated as a straightforward appli-
cation of the cost-benefit rationality standard. This would entail
comparing the intended public benefits against the burdens that a
taking would impose on the dispossessed party and require, at the
least, that the benefits to the public not be disproportionate to the
harms imposed on the party whose property is taken.13  This ap-
proach comes closer than the others to recognizing the interests of
those harmed. Because it only counts public benefits toward justify-
ing a taking, this approach is able to rule out purely private transfers
by not including gains to private parties in the calculus of interests.
In p'ractice, however, it will be difficult to disentangle the public from
the private benefits given the logical interdependence between the
two. Nevertheless, a cost-benefit standard has some intuitive plausi-
bility as an account of the minimal requirements for justification. It
remains to be considered, as I will in the next section, whether there
are further reasons to make the demands of justification even more
rigorous.
A fourth approach would construe the Public Use Clause to re-
quire an assessment of a proposed taking in terms of abstract deonto-
logical considerations of fairness and justice.134  This assessment
would rest upon a presumption that the value of preserving posses-
sory interests is paramount, and that only very weighty social consid-
erations could override it. This approach does not specify a system-
atic procedure to be followed; it simply requires the type of careful
reflection characteristic of a deontological approach to moral reason-
ing.' 3 5 What it might mean in practice is that a court would deliberate
" This approach is not specifically endorsed in any public use case, but it is inspired by re-
cent dicta from a regulatory takings case: "in a general sense concerns for proportionality ani-
mate the Takings Clause." City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)
(holding, however, that its "rough proportionality" standard for exactions did not apply to the
instant case).
" This approach is judicially grounded in a suggestion from Armstrong v. United States. "The
Fifth Amendment's guarantee... was designed to bar the Government from forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole." 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
11 The standard could be made somewhat more specific, for instance, by incorporating
something like Scanlon's notion of reasonable rejection: the policy is justifiable if it would be
unreasonable for the person who is affected by it to reject it. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 195.
This does not mean that the taking must be done with the actual approval of those affected by
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about the competing interests involved (the public benefits and indi-
vidual burdens) and reach a conclusion based on the overall force of
reasons. There is no predetermined formula for weighing interests
against one another. It is simply a matter of reasoned judgment. The
justification of a taking, on this view, depends on its being judged to
serve a public purpose of such substantial weight that it is morally ac-
ceptable to disturb otherwise legitimate property interests. The un-
derlying concern of the judicial scrutiny will be to ensure that indi-
viduals are not arbitrarily singled out for disfavorable treatment by
the government. 1 6  It should be clear that the use of the takings
power does not result in arbitrary mistreatment. As a general pre-
cept, social costs should be spread across the society as a whole.
Thus, situations in which certain individuals are asked to bear dis-
proportionate social costs raise heightened concerns for justification.
Because takings directly involve the unequal distribution of public
burdens, they implicate a concern to ensure not only that they serve
some public good, but that this good is sufficiently important to jus-
tify the harm on particular parties.
These last two approaches to construing the public use require-
ment are both plausible frameworks for satisfying the demands of po-
litical justification of the use of the takings power. The remaining is-
sue to resolve, then, is how to decide between them.
B. "Public Use" as a Deontological Principle?
There are contexts in which the collective good appears to war-
rant limitations on the pursuit of individual well-being. Much eco-
nomic and environmental regulation is supportable on this principle.
But there are also some interests so important that they may not be
sacrificed even when doing so would serve the end of social utility.
Thus we find constitutional guarantees for certain fundamental liber-
ties.'3 The problem of takings tests our principles. Are interests in
property closer to the fundamental liberties in a democratic commu-
nity or to more limited rights to economic participation?3 9 No doubt,
it, who will naturally have grounds for being upset. The idea of reasonableness is an objective
one.
's This concern can also be expressed by its corollary, that private individuals should not
receive arbitrary preference from government policies. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1689
(characterizing this concern of preference as underlying most of the major constitutional tests).
"' See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (stating that the public use requirement was intended to pre-
vent the few from bearing public burdens).
' The First Amendment is readily understood in this way.
I speak of interests in property rather than rights because it is unclear that there is a right
to property in the same way as a right to free speech. Although all rights admit of some limita-
tion at the margins, in general, individual rights function as trumps over social utility. Our con-
stitutional system does not accord this level of protection to interests in property. On the con-
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we share a conviction that interests in property are deeply important
for many reasons. 40 Property interests, however, are widely perceived
to have less of a claim to inviolability than political liberties. The best
characterization may be that property interests occupy a nebulous
middle ground. But this does not settle the question of which model
of political justification is most appropriate for resolving the conflict
of interests between the public and private individuals that a taking
raises.
This final section provides two arguments for preferring a deonto-
logical standard of justification to resolving disputes over the scope of
public use. Applying this standard, however, does not entail accord-
ing the same degree of substantive protections to property interests as
it does to political liberties. Such a heightened standard of justifica-
tion simply requires a more deliberative judicial inquiry. It asks that
careful attention be paid to the nature and extent of the burdens im-
posed on individuals for the benefit of the public as a whole to en-
sure that the proposed taking is not an arbitrary imposition of gov-
ernment power.
The first argument is a negative one against the viability of cost-
benefit rationality as a sufficient form ofjustification. Cost-benefit ra-
tionality, being a close cousin of utilitarianism, is vulnerable to one of
the most important criticisms of utilitarianism: that it fails to respect
the distinctness of persons. 14' Because cost-benefit rationality looks
only to the aggregate balance of benefits and burdens, it is insensitive
to the moral difference between a distribution that concentrates bur-
dens on a few people and one which spreads them across many per-
sons. The value of fairness dictates a concern with the distribution of
burdens, not merely their sum total. When confronted with an
asymmetrically burdensome public policy, as the use of takings power
is, it is important to consider whether the benefit to be achieved
really can justify the unfair manner in which it is to be brought about.
What matters, then, is not simply the aggregate benefit to be
achieved, but also the kind of benefit. Only very important social
goals that cannot be brought about in another manner should be eli-
gible for consideration as appropriate ends of a taking. In principle,
cost-benefit rationality would sanction imposing extraordinary bur-
dens on some persons so that others (as long as there are enough of
ception of rights as trumps, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194 (1977). But
for an argument that property rights are fundamental, inviolable rights, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
'0 They contribute to the satisfaction of our basic needs, they provide for physical and eco-
nomic security, they enable a free market in goods and services, they comprise constituents of
our moral personality, and they connect us to community. On these points see, for example,
RADIN, supra note 29, at 38-43; JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 3-5 (1988).
"' This argument is the one famously made byJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 27 (1971).
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them) would enjoy merely trivial improvements in their well-being.
But there is a strong intuition that trivial improvements to the welfare
of many people cannot justify imposing a significant burden on one
person. In practice, concededly, there may not be a great differ-
ence between the two approaches if either were adopted by the
courts. There may be political constraints that limit the abuses of
eminent domain. To be sure, cost-benefit rationality is an advance
over the meager standard ofjustification contained in prevailing pub-
lic use doctrine. But in theoretical terms, it does not go far enough
toward realizing an interpersonal form ofjustification, which requires
that the individual who is burdened be capable of recognizing the
reasonableness of the cost imposed on her.
The second argument in favor of a deontological model of justifi-
cation for public use rests on its ability to accommodate a special
concern with protecting the interests of socially and politically disad-
vantaged populations that may be most vulnerable to being harmed
through the use of eminent domain. Not only do takings involve an
asymmetry of burdens, but in reality, these burdens are most likely to
be imposed on politically ineffective constituencies. While it seems
intuitively plausible that a taking for the purpose of eliminating slums
and blight will generally be justifiable, it is not always certain whether
the net social benefit achieved will actually benefit the population
that is directly burdened by the taking.
The context of slum and blight removal provides an apt scenario
for illustrating the contrast between the cost-benefit and deontologi-
cal approaches. A development plan involving condemnation and
taking might do an effective job at improving the physical infrastruc-
ture of an area. From the perspective of a cost-benefit assessment,
there might be substantial economic gains that far outweigh the costs
imposed on the dispossessed residents. All the same, the project
could leave the residents as badly off, or worse off, as they were be-
fore. 4 3 Cost-benefit rationality makes a wholly impartial calculation
of benefits and harms. But what is often warranted is an approach
that specifically attends to the concerns of those who are most bur-
dened. A deontological approach to the justification of a taking fo-
cuses on the interests of those persons who are most relevantly af-
fected by it. A taking is justified if it treats these persons fairly, not
merely if it improves aggregate social welfare.
144
"2 Id. at 28.
143 Even if they find comparable or better housing, they may be worse off in terms of being
separated from their work, schools, family, or community ties.
" It cannot be settled theoretically what fair treatment entails in every circumstance. But in
some cases it may mean that a development plan makes some allowance for the dispossessed
residents directly to benefit from the revitalization of an area, or that there are assurances that
they will be relocated to a better area than the one they are compelled to leave.
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Takings possess the possibility for imposing arbitrary harms on a
powerless political constituency. Given this possibility, it is important
that courts be sensitive to these kinds of concerns when they allow an
asymmetrically burdensome social policy to proceed. Judicial delib-
erations will often have to stand in for the full participation of all
viewpoints in the political process. Thus, to say that the demands of
justification ought to be heightened is to suggest that courts have a
special duty to attend to the possibility of harm to a population that is
less capable of defending its interests in the political and legal arena.
By applying a deontological method of justification to the scrutiny of
takings, our judicial system will come closer to protecting these inter-
ests.
CONCLUSION
The use of takings power should occur when there are special cir-
cumstances providing a distinctive rationale for this use of public au-
thority. As Justice Holmes once noted:
[T] here might be exceptional times and places in which the very foundations of
public welfare could not be laid without requiring concessions from indi-
viduals to each other upon due compensation which under other cir-
cumstances would be left wholly to voluntary consent. In such unusual
cases there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment which prevents a
State from requiring such concessions.1
45
This suggests giving far less latitude to the idea of a justifying pub-
lic purpose than "any conceivable public purpose" allowed in the
later cases. Rather, the justification for a taking depends on there be-
ing distinctively important social concerns, ostensibly ones that out-
weigh the harm imposed. 46 The burden should rest on legislatures to
show exceptional need, not ordinary legislative business, to justify a
taking. The justifying circumstances must be truly compelling to ask
individuals to bear unusual social costs. It will be unreasonable for
individual property owners to refuse to give up their claims to prop-
erty if serious harm to others in society is likely to ensue, but it is rea-
sonable for them to object when the moral urgency at stake does not
rise to requisite level.
As it stands, the interpretation of the public use limitation cur-
rently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Midkiff and Berman does not
articulate an adequate justification for the taking of property. The
substantive standard it applies does not require a full consideration of
interests, especially the interests of those who are harmed by the tak-
ing. By requiring courts only to go so far as to inquire whether there
14 Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (emphasis added).
W4 Id.
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is some public purpose, without considering the proportional signifi-
cance of the purpose relative to harms, the standard fails to ensure
that adequate reasons are offered to the party who bears the burden.
The policy will not be justifiable to that person unless she can recog-
nize the validity of this social choice in light of the public significance
of the interests it serves. When something as important as the invol-
untary dispossession of property is at stake, careful reflection upon its
justifiability is warranted. The Supreme Court's current position on
the demands of the public use limitation does not provide it.
